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This grant funded research on human-computer interaction design and
analysis techniques, using future ATC environments as a testbed. The basic
approach was to model the nominal behavior of both the automated and hu-
man procedures and then to apply safety analysis techniques to these models.
Our previous modeling language, RSML, had been used to specify the sys-
tem requirements for TCAS II for the FAA. Using the lessons learned from
this experience, we designed a new modeling language that (among other
things) incorporates features to assist in designing less error-prone human-
computer interactions and interfaces and in detecting potential HCI prob-
lems, such as mode confusion. The new language, SpecTRM-RL, uses "in-
tent" abstractions, based on Rasmussen's abstraction hierarchy, and includes
both informal (English and graphical) specifications and formal, executable
models for specifying various aspects of the system. One of the goals for our
language was to highlight the system modes and mode changes to assist in
identifying the potential for mode confusion.
Three published papers resulted from this research (see attached). The
first builds on the work of Degani on mode confusion to identify aspects
of the system design that could lead to potential hazards. We defined and
modeled modes differently than Degani and also defined design criteria for
SpecTRM-RL models. Our design criteria include the Degani criteria but
extend them to include more potential problems. In a second paper, Leveson
and Palmer showed how the criteria for indirect mode transitions could be
dUN 1 5 lggg
Ca. 9 L
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19990063821 2020-06-15T21:32:57+00:00Z
applied to a mode confusion problem found in several ASRS reports for the
MD-88.
In addition, we defined a visual task modeling language that can be used
by system designers to model human-computer interaction. The visual mod-
els can be translated into SpecTRM-RL models, and then the SpecTRM-RL
suite of analysis tools can be used to perform formal and informal safety
analyses on the task model in isolation or integrated with the rest of the
modeled system.
We had hoped to be able to apply these modeling languages and analysis
tools to a TAP air/ground trajectory negotiation scenario, but the develop-
merit of the tools took more time than we anticipated.
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Introduction
Advanced automation has been accompanied, particu-
larly in aircraft, with a proliferation of modes, where
modes define mutually exclusive sets of system behavior.
The new mode-rich systems provide flexibility and en-
hanced capabilities, but they also increase the need for
and difficulty of maintaining mode awareness. While au-
tomation has eliminated some types of operator mode-
awareness errors, it has also created the potential for
new types of mode-related problems [SW95].
After studying accidents and incidents in the new,
highly automated aircraft, Sarter and Woods have con-
cluded that certain errors are non-random and pre-
dictable [SW95]: They are the regular and predictable
consequences of a variety of identifiable factors. Al-
though these errors are accentuated by poor interface
design and gaps or misconceptions in the user's mental
model of the system, an important factor is inconsistent
automation behavior.
Sarter and Woods have identified some of these pre-
dictable error forms. Leveson et. al. [LPS97] and De-
gani [Deg96] have defined taxonomies of automation fea-
tures that lead to mode confusion. This paper describes
an approach to dealing with mode confusion errors by
first modeling blackbox software behavior and then us-
ing analysis methods and tools to assist in searching the
models for predictable error forms, i.e., for features that
contribute to operator mistakes. The analysis results
can be used to redesign the automation, to change op-
erator training and procedures, or to design appropriate
human-computer interfaces to help avoid mistakes.
The approach requires a model of the blackbox behavior
that is both formal and easily readable and reviewable
by humans. The models we use are part of the software
specifications in a methodology called SpecTRM (Speci-
fication Tools and Requirements Methodology) and thus
the analysis is done directly on the system requirements
specification and does not require extra modeling ef-
fort. SpecTRM includes a suite of analysis tools to
detect errors and potentially hazardous behavior early
in system development when tradeoffs and changes can
more easily be made. In addition to providing design
guidance, this approach might provide a way of "mea-
suring" or evaluating the cognitive demands involved
in working with specific automated devices. Hansman
has suggested that automation complexity be defined in
terms of the predictability of the automation behavior
[Hans97]. This predictability can potentially be evalu-
ated on the formal SpecTRM-RL (SpecTRM Require-
ments Language) models.
The rest of the paper provides more information about
the approach and illustrates its use on a commonly re-
ported mode confusion error called a "kill-the-capture"
bust.
Mode Confusion Analysis
Most accidents related to software behavior can be
traced back to errors or omissions in the software re-
quirements, not to implementation or coding errors
[Lev95, Lut93]. Although a great deal of effort has been
expended in software engineering on finding software
design and implementation errors, much less has been
accomplished in terms of validating requirements spec-
ifications beyond executing them for a few test cases
or showing the consistency of a formal specification
with various properties of the underlying mathemati-
cal model [HL96, HLK95]. Most of the specfication er-
rors and omissions that lead to accidents are unlikely to
be found using these techniques. The testing of any
complex software is necessarily very incomplete, and
consistency with a mathematical model does not im-
ply consistency with required properties of a real world
application.
To deal with this problem, we have specified a set of
criteria for completeness and correctness of blackbox
process-control requirements specifications that are re-
lated to safety [JLHM91, Lev95]. These criteria were
derived using real accidents and industrial experience
with process-control software, and they have been vali-
dated by experimental application to the NASA Gallileo
and Voyager software [Lut92, Lut93] and through indus-
trial use. We are contining to extend the criteria, most
recently with the goal of reducing mode confusion er-
rors, and to validate them on real software [MLR97].
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Figure 2: Modified Model to Account for Operator Er-
ror and Mode Confusion.
To apply the criteria, a blackbox state-machine model of
the automation behavior is required. Blackbox require-
ments specifications do not contain information about
internal design (the software design if the automated
controller is a computer) but are written strictly in
terms of externally visible inputs and outputs and the
effects of these on a model of the process being con-
trolled (see Figure 1). The process model is based on:
1. Current process state inferred from measured vari-
ables,
2. Past measured and inferred process states and vari-
ables,
3. Past outputs to actuators, and
4. Prediction of future states of the controlled process.
Accidents related to requirements (behavioral) specifi-
cation occur when the internal model of the process be-
comes inconsistent with the state of the controlled pro-
cess. This inconsistency may result from an incorrect
model being specified originally (e.g., the model does
not include basic required behavior for unusual or in-
frequently occurring cases) or from the modeled system
state being updated incorrectly during execution, per-
haps as a result of incorrect input from the sensors.
To define criteria related to mode confusion, we need to
add a model of the controller-software interface to the
automated controller. We also need to consider the su-
pervisors' internal models of the expected behavior and
state of the process and of the automated controller (see
Figure 2). Accidents in this extended model may result
from any of these models being incorrect or becoming
inconsistent with the true state of the controlled pro-
cess, the automated controller, or the supervisory inter-
face (the human-computer interface). That is, accidents
may result if any of the models are or become inconsis-
tent with the state of the thing they are modeling and
decisions or actions are made on the basis of the incor-
rect model. Criteria for correctness and safety can be
specified in terms of these formal models and checked
for particular system specifications.
Of course, we are not suggesting that it is possible to
specify human mental models. Each person may have a
different mental model of the system and the automa-
tion, and these may change over time within the same
person. In fact, operators have been found to be able to
function with multiple and inconsistent models [Luc87].
However, it is possible to state some high-level abstrac-
tions about required features of correct operator men-
tal models--for example, that particular actions on the
part of the operator will result eventually in particular
changes in the automation and/or the system.
Note that we assume here that the operator's models are
correct. This assumption will obviously not always be
true. However, our approach involves first eliminating
hazards for the ideal case. Then various types of hazard
analysis can be used to determine which types of erro-
neous models will have the most serious consequences.
The resulting information can be used for automation
design, interface design, and operator training.
A previous paper described six categories of potential
design flaws that can lead to mode confusion errors:
interface interpretation flaws, inconsistent behavior, in-
direct mode changes, operator authority limits, unin-
tended side effects, and lack of appropriate feedback
[LPS97]. The rest of this paper shows an example of
this approach for one particular common cause of mode
confusion error, i.e., indirect mode changes. The ba-
sic criteria and analysis technique is being specified for-
mally [Lev97], but we include only an informal descrip-
tion here.
Indirect Mode Change Example
Indirect mode changes occur when the automation
changes mode without an explicit instruction by the op-
erator. Such transitions may be triggered on conditions
in the controller (such as preprogrammed envelope pro-
tection) or sensor input about the state of the controlled
system (such as achievement of a target value). Indirect
mode transitions create the potential for mode confu-
sion and inadvertent activation of modes by the human
controller. For example, the human controller may not
update his or her models of the state of the process and
the state of the automation and, based on these now in-
correct models, issue an incorrect control command or
fail to issue a required command.
An example of an accident that has been attributed to
an indirect mode change occurred while an A-320 was
landing in Bangalore. In this case, the pilot selection
of a lower altitude while the automation was in the AL-
TITUDE ACQUISITION mode resulted in the activation
of the OPEN DESCENT mode. It has been speculated
that the pilots did not notice the mode annunciation
because the indirect mode change occurred during ap-
proach when the pilots were busy and they were not
expecting the change [SW95]. Another example of such
an indirect mode change in the A-320 automation in-
volves an automatic mode transition triggered when the
airspeed exceeds a predefined limit. For example, if the
pilot selects a very high vertical speed that results in
the airspeed decreasing below a particular limit, the au-
tomation will change to the OPEN CLIMB mode, which
allows the airplane to regain speed.
Palmer has described another example of a common
indirect mode transition problem called a "kill-the-
capture bust" that has been noted in many ASRS re-
ports [Pal96]. Here we show the relevant parts of a
SpecTRM-RL specification of the MD-88 control logic
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and describe how the problem can be detected and fixed.
In the incident, the crew had just made a missed ap-
proach and had climbed to and leveled at 2,100 feet.
Figure 3 shows the sequence of Flight Mode Annun-
ciator (FMA) values during the incident. The crew
received the clearance to "...climb now and maintain
5,000 feet ...". The Captain set the desired altitude
to 5,000 feet, set the autopilot pitch mode to verti-
cal speed with a value of approximately 2,000 feet per
minute and the autothrottle to SPD mode with a value
of 256 knots (Figure 3(c) and (d)). Climbing through
3,500 feet, the Captain called for flaps up, and at 4,000
feet he called for slats retract and pushed the IAS but-
ton (Figure 3(f)). The pitch mode became IAS, and
the autothrottle went to CLAMP mode. At this point,
altitude capture was still armed. Three seconds later,
the autopilot automatically switched to altitude cap-
ture mode. The arm window went blank, and the pitch
window showed ALT CAP (Figure 3(g)). A tenth of a sec-
ond later, the Captain adjusted the vertical speed wheel
to a value of about 4,000 feet per minute. This speed
adjustment caused the pitch autopilot mode to switch
from altitude capture to vertical speed (Figure 3(h)).
Climbing through 4,500 feet, the FMA was as shown
in Figure 3(h), and the approaching altitude light was
on. As the altitude passed through 5,000 feet at a verti-
cal velocity of about 4,000 feet per minute, the Captain
remarked, "Five thousand. Oops, it didn't arm." He
pushed the ALT HOLD button and switched off the au-
tothrottle. The aircraft continued to climb to about
5,500 feet and the ALTITUDE-ALTITUDE voice warning
sounded repeatedly.
To identify and fix the problem, we use a formal model.
A SpecTRM-RL model has two parts: a graphical model
of the state machine and a specification of the logic on
the transitions. Figure 4 shows part of the graphical
SpecTRM-RL state machine model of the MD-88 verti-
cal control logic needed to understand the incident and
how to fix the software to avoid it. In order to keep the
model small enough to fit in the paper, only parts of
it are shown but during system engineering a complete
model would be constructed. The graphical model has
three main parts: the input-output interface (where the
supervisory interface is one part), the operating modes
of the automation itself (in this case the autoflight sys-
tem), and the process model which includes both the
process (aircraft) operating modes and models of the
aircraft components.
In the supervisory interface, square boxes denote in-
I)nts and outputs having finite state values. Circles rep-
resent numbers. Note that this model represents the
automated controller's view of the state of the inter-
face, not necessarily the real state of the controls and
displays. A complete safety analysis would evaluate if
and how discrepancies between the two could occur and
also whether such discrepancies could lead to hazardous
system states.
The state transition logic is specified in SpecTRM-RL
using a form of logic tables we call AND/OR tables. A
transition can be taken if any of the columns of the table
evaluates to true. A column evaluates to true if all the
(non-blank) rows in a column are true. Figure 5 shows
the relevant transition logic for the example.
The problem occurs because the transition to ALT CAP
mode results in a transition of the capture mode to UN-
ARMED before the altitude has actually been acquired.
Although this is annunciated to the pilot by the Arm an-
nunciator changing to blank when pitch mode changes
to ALT CAP, the absence of an indicator is well known
to be an error-prone way to notify the pilot of a mode
change.
How could this be detected from examining the logic?
In general, an indirect mode change is one that occurs
without an explicit pilot action to change the mode. The
vertical control logic for the example has three mode
transitions that do not require direct pilot input: (1)
the transition from ANY to ALT CAP, (2) the second col-
umn of the transition from ANY to ALT HOLD, i.e, when
the altitude is acquired and the pitch is in mode ALT
CAP, and (3) the second column of the transition from
ARMED to NOT ARMED. Each of these mode transitions
is triggered by a change in a controlled system variable
or by internal mode change within the automation.
We will assume that the pilot's mental model includes
a cause and effect relationship between arming the al-
titude capture and eventually (although it may not be
immediately) acquiring that altitude and holding it:
set altitude and pull ALT --* ... --* ALT HOLD.
Formal analysis will show that there is a path through
the logic starting with the pilot pulling the altitude knob
that does not result in the ALT HOLD state (specifically,
this occurs when the automation is in the modes NOT
ARMED and ALT CAP and the pilot does something that
changes the pitch mode, in this case adjusting the ver-
tical speed wheel).
One way to fix the problem is to change the transition
logic to that shown in Figure 6. Note that although the
second column of the transition table from ANY to ALT
HOLD still does not require direct pilot input, the transi-
tion is not indirect by our definition because it satisfies
the pilot model of the transition logic above. The tran-
sition from ANY to ALT CAP is still indirect, but there is
no longer a path through the vertical control logic that
violates the expected cause and effect relation between
arming the capture and capturing the altitude when it is
acquired. We note that this solution may violate other
goals or desired behaviors of the autoflight system--the
designers would have to determine this when deciding
what solution to use. In addition, a more sophisticated
solution may be required, e.g., a hysteresis factor may
need to be added to the mode transition logic to avoid
too rapid or "ping-ponging" transitions between pitch
modes.
Finding indirect mode transitions does not mean the
software must be changed. The identified criteria are
simply clues for determining where to look for potential
problems. The designers may decide that no real prob-
lem exists and make no changes or they may decide not
to change the automation but instead to make changes
in the interface design or in pilot training.
In general, it is not feasible to make all mode transitions
direct in any sophisticated automated controller. The
goal instead is to simplify the required pilot model of
the automation behavior as much as possible. In this
case, the pilot expects a direct mode transition from set-
ting a target altitude and arming the altitude capture to
eventually attaining capturing altitude, changing to ALT
HOLD mode, canceling the ARM command. Any paths in
the automation logic that will violate this assumption
will be a source of potential mode confusion, even if the
mode change is annunciated. Of course, the pilot may
have more sophisticated knowledge of the automation
logic and know that adjusting the vertical speed wheel
will cancel the previously given altitude capture com-
mand. However, ,this knowledge assumes a much more
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complex model of automation behavior on the part of
the pilot and makes the automation behavior more dif-
ficult to predict. The number of ASRS reports on this
error leads us to believe that this assumption is not re-
alistic.
Several caveats are important here. First, we are only
guessing at the MC-88 software logic on the basis of the
observed behavior. The real software specifications or
code would have to be examined to determine what logic
is actually implemented. Second, making the change we
have recommended may not be feasible (or correct) due
to other tmmodeled parts of the logic that depend on the
ARMED mode: A real development project would have
the entire logic modeled and would be able to make the
appropriate tradeoffs and design decisions.
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Abstract
As control systems become more complex, the use of
automated control has increased. At the same time, the
role of the human operator has changed from primary
system controller to supervisor or monitor. Safe de-
sign of the human-computer interaction becomes more
difficult.
In this paper, we present a visual task modeling lan-
guage that can be used by system designers to model
human-computer interactions. The visual models can
be translated into SpeeTRM-RL, a blackbox specifica-
tion language for modeling the automated portion of
the control system. The SpecTRM-RL suite of analysis
tools allow the designer to perform formal and infor-
mal safety analyses on the task model in isolation or
integrated with the rest of the modeled system.
1 Introduction
Increased complexity of control systems and advances
in computer technology have combined to give automa-
tion a more authoritative role in control systems. As a
result, many of these control systems rely on both hu-
man and automated controllers. For these controllers
to interact effectively, the human-computer interaction
must be carefully designed.
We began looking at these issues while working
with the Terminal Area Productivity (TAP) Project
at NASA Ames [PPC97]. The TAP Project is design-
ing terminal area procedures for air traffic using data
links in addition to voice contact to communicate tra-
jectories and routing information between the air traf-
fic controller and the aircraft.
Traditionally, HCI design has focused on the human
user's point of view: what functionality is needed to
support the tasks the human must accomplish. There
*The research described has been funded by NASA
Grant NAG-l-1894.
have been numerous models for human task analysis
developed to identify the knowledge and steps required
to perform each human task.
Unlike traditional task modeling methods that focus
on analyzing specific aspects of the HCI design, such
as user goals or knowledge representation, our model-
ing technique has a more general focus. Our technique
allows the designer to model the steps required to com-
plete the task so she can study how these steps interact
with the rest of the system. Specific environment cues
required to complete a task are modeled as conditions
on transitions between steps in a task. Depending on
the visualization created to inspect the model, the an-
alyst can focus on the knowledge needed throughout
the task, on the steps required to complete the task or
on some other model aspect of interest.
Our modeling methodology takes a system-centric
view compared to the human-centered view of other
task analysis methods. With a tighter coupling be-
tween the human and automated controllers in com-
plex systems, the human controller must be viewed as
a part of the entire system, therefore the interaction be-
tween the human and the computer should be viewed
in the context of the entire system.
Our modeling technique focuses on formally analyz-
ing a model of the controller's tasks independently and
in the context of the complete control system model.
Throughout the evolution of our method, we had three
goals:
• To create a reasonable model of the actions of the
human controller.
• To develop a model that can be formally analyzed
with respect to safety concerns.
To interface the model of the human controller tasks
with formal models of the rest of the complex sys-
tem.
To realizethesegoals,wecreateda visual task
modelinglanguagethat allowsthe analystto easily
representthe necessaryinformationaboutthe con-
troller'stasks.Thesetaskmodelscanbetranslated
into theblackboxrequirementsspecificationlanguage
SpecTRM-RLand analyzedusinga suiteof anal-
ysis tools. SpecTRM-RLwasdevelopedto model
all the componentsof controlsystems,thereforethe
SpecTRM-RLmodelof thecontrollertaskscanbein-
tegratedwith themodelof theothercomponentsin
thecontrolsystem.
Therestof thepaperisorganizedin thefollowing
way:Section2describestheSpecTRMtoolsuiteand
SpecTRM-RLmodelinglanguage;Section3 describes
ourapproachto achievingthe goalswesetfor our-
selves;Section4 explainstheexamplemodelthat we
usethroughoutthepaperto illustrateourtaskmodel-
ingmethodology;Sections5and 6describethevisual
taskmodelinglanguageandhowthesemodelsarecre-
ated;Section7 demonstrates how the safety analysis
tools can be applied to these models; Section 8 dis-
cusses other work in the area of task modeling and
analysis; and Section 9 discusses the contributions of
this work and possible future questions to explore.
2 SpecTRM
The Software Safety Group at the University of Wash-
ington has developed a methodology for software spec-
ification called SpecTRM (Specification Tools and Re-
quirements Methodology). Complex system develop-
ment relies on multiple disciplines: system engineers,
software engineers, human factors experts and ap-
plication experts. SpecTRM takes a global system
viewpoint to provide an environment to assist multi-
disciplinary teams. With a single consistent model of
the complex system, analysts from each discipline can
focus on the aspect of the system that is of interest to
them.
The center of SpecTRM is SpecTRM-RL (SpecTRM
Requirements Language), a formal requirements spec-
ification language for modeling blackbox behavior of
control systems [Lev98]. SpecTRM-RL supports a
wide-range of problem-solving strategies and tasks dur-
ing system development and evolution.
Models written in SpecTRM-RL can be analyzed by
the SpecTRM suite of tools. The SpecTRM tools were
developed to detect errors and potentially hazardous
behavior. The tool set is being expanded but currently
includes:
• Model execution
• Automated formal analyses, such as consistency and
completeness checks
• Automated tools to help with model exploration
during forward and backward analyses
• Deviation analysis to test the robustness of system
design to abnormal inputs
• Visualization tools to allow a wide-range of views of
the executing model
These tools provide a flexible framework in which many
complimentary analyses can be performed on a single
model to help ensure total system safety.
3 Approach
We do not attempt to model erroneous human behav-
ior, but limit our models to the expected controller
behavior (both nominal and off-nominal) as defined in
operational procedures. The models also include ex-
ternal inputs representing qualities of the environment
that give rise to the human controller's decisions.
In many cases, the exact triggering conditions of a
task are not necessary to have a meaningful model of
the system. Any external or internal conditions that
are particularly salient to the executing task are ex-
plicitly modeled while all other environmental effects
are grouped into external conditions.
We quickly found that SpecTRM-RL models were
not the most effective way to specify human tasks for
system designers and human factors experts. For one
thing, it was difficult to separate nominal from off-
nominal behavior using the SpecTRM-RL notation. It
was also difficult to see communication flow between
the different components in the model. These limita-
tions in expressibility led us to the development of a
visual modeling language that has the characteristics
lacking in SpecTRM-RL but remains easily translat-
able to SpecTRM-RL for analysis purposes.
4 Handoff Procedure Example
Throughout this paper, we will be using our model
of a handoff procedure to illustrate our task modeling
language. A "handoff", or a change of aircraft con-
troller, occurs whenever an aircraft is changing from
one controlling sector to another. The handoff pro-
cedure involves communication between the controller
currently controlling the aircraft, the next controller
to control the aircraft, and the pilot. Our model of
this procedure includes the required tasks from each
controller's point of view and the pilot's point of view.
The handoff procedure model also includes a model of
the radio used by the pilot to control the frequency to
which she listens for controller communication. The
radio component is included in the model because it
isanintegralpartofthehardware/softwareportionof
thesystemduringthehandoffprocedure.
Wechosethis modelto demonstrateour model-
ingandanalysistechniquebecausethemodelis com-
plexenoughto haveinterestingcharacteristicswhile
remainingclearenoughto be easilyunderstoodby
readerswhoarenot familiarwith air trafficcontrol.
Thehandoffprocedureconsistsofmultiplecomponents
eachwithvarietyoftasksto completeandinteresting
interactionswithothercomponents.
5 Description of Visual Modeling Lan-
guage
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the visual model for current
implementation of the handoff procedure in air traffic
control systems.
The key on Figure 1 displays the components of the
visual modeling language. States are used to represent
each step required to complete a higher-level task. To
change from one state to the next in the model, a tran-
sition must occur. Changing the current model state
represents the completion of one subtask and the be-
ginning of the next subtask. An event is the triggering
condition for a transition and an action results from
completing a transition. The default, or start, state
is denoted by an arrow head on the left side of the
state. For example, in the Current Controller model of
Figure 1 the state Aircraft being controlled by current
controller is the start state. The model can transition
to the state Initiating handoff if the event Conditions
for handoff occur fires. In this example, there is no
resulting action from the transition.
Color is used in the model to differentiate between
events and actions. The events triggering a transition
are shown in blue text above the transition, while any
actions resulting from the transition are shown in red
text beneath the transition. A green outline around
event or action text denotes that this is a communi-
cation point between two entities in the model. For
example, in Figure 1 there is a green outline around
the action Initiate Handoff in the Current Controller
model and a green outline around the event Initiate
Handoffin the Next Controller model. The green out-
line denotes that the action of initiating a handoff in
the Current Controller model causes a transition to
occur in the Next Controller model.
Task positioning is used to represent relationships
among the steps in a task. The normative actions are
seen on the main horizontal axis of each controller's
task model. Any non-normative behavior diverges
from the main axis until the situation has been cor-
rected and the normative procedure resumes. For ex-
ample, in the Next Controller model of Figure 1, reject-
ing the handoff is not the expected or nominal behavior
of the Next Controller. The events, states and actions
required to handle this sequence of subtasks are shown
below the main axis of the Next Controller's behaviors.
When the off-nominal steps have been completed, the
model can return to a state on the main horizontal axis
to represent returning to the nominal behavior.
The visual modeling language also allows the sys-
tem designer to represent the relationship among the
tasks that are being carried out by the model entities.
To accurately represent the load on the human con-
troller, the system designer must understand these re-
lationships accurately. The system designer must un-
derstand which tasks are sequential and which tasks
can be performed in any order. The Pilot model, Fig-
ure 2, shows how these task relationships are repre-
sented. The action Issue frequency change must occur
before the Pilot can perform the subtasks to change the
radio frequency and read back the Next Controller's
frequency to the Current Controller. The branching in
the transition arrows shows how changing the radio fre-
quency and performing the read back are executed in
some undetermined order. These tasks could be per-
formed in parallel or in a sequential order chosen by
the Pilot. The system designer must understand these
possible interactions to ensure that the tasks do not
overload the Pilot no matter what order she chooses
to execute the tasks.
6 Construction of Task Models
The basis of the visual model is a task analysis. The
task analysis identifies the major tasks of the con-
troller components in the system then breaks these
high level tasks into subtasks, down to the level of
the key presses, voice communications, display cues,
etc. involved in performing the task. From the task
analysis, the visual model is created. The visual model
easily represents the temporal relationships among the
tasks carried out by a single component in the model
and the relationships among multiple components in
the model.
The SpecTRM-RL model is created based on the
visual model. The conversion is a straightforward pro-
cess of converting the visual relationships to a text-
based modeling language. Whereas the visual model-
ing language uses entities, states, events and actions to
represent the system, the SpecTRM-RL model decom-
poses the system into components, operating modes,
and input/output interfaces. A component is a por-
tion of the system with a well-defined interface to the
rest of the system. Each high-level system entity and
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theexternalenvironmentbecomea componentin the
SpecTRM-RLmodel.Forthehandoffprocedure,the
componentsin theSpecTRM-RLmodelaretheCur-
rent Controller,the NextController,the Pilot, and
the Radio.Thestatesin thevisualmodeltranslate
to operating modes in the SpecTRM-RL model. For
example, from the visual model shown in Figure 3
the Radio component has two operating modes: Fre-
quency 1 Active/Frequency 2 Standby and Frequency 2
Active/Frequency 1 Standby.
Translating the communication interfaces is slightly
more difficult. The events in the visual model map to
input interfaces for the SpecTRM-RL model compo-
nents. If the event was marked as a communication
point with another entity in the visual model (denoted
by the green outline around the event label), the cor-
responding input will come from another SpecTRM-
RL component. Otherwise, the event will map to an
input from the external environment. Actions in the
visual model translate to the output interfaces for the
SpecTRM-RL components.
7 Analysis of Models
The human procedure model, along with SpecTRM-
RL models of the other parts of the system, can be used
in the safety analysis of the human-computer interac-
tion. The SpecTRM tool set currently allows model
execution, various types of safety analysis, and visual-
ization.
7.1 Model Execution
Because the task models are executable, the system
designer can inspect the specified dynamic interaction
between the system components, including both the
operators and the automated components. In this way,
procedural errors, possible inconsistencies in the pro-
cedures, or incomplete procedural specifications can be
detected. We found that model execution helped us to
find several errors in the specification.
7.2 Safety Analysis Tools
The SpecTRM tool set has multiple fully automated or
partially automated analyses that can be performed on
the models to help identify possible unsafe aspects of
the system requirements. Consistency and complete-
ness analysis identifies inconsistencies in the specifica-
tion and conditions not accounted for in the specifica-
tion [HL96]. For example, the automated completeness
check on this model found that the Pilot's behavior is
not completely specified. During the handoff proce-
dure, the model does not show how the Pilot should act
if she reads back an incorrect frequency. This incom-
pleteness in the specification is likely to be the result
of an oversight of the system designer as she builds the
model, but the completeness check aids the analyst by
highlighting these possible oversights.
Deviation Analysis provides a way to evaluate
the specification for robustness against incorrect in-
puts [RL97a, RL97b]. The analyst denotes potential
hazardous outputs that she wants to check for and hy-
pothesizes deviations in the inputs, for example, that
measured speed is lower than actual speed. The Devi-
ation Analysis tool will determine whether the devia-
tion can lead to a hazardous state and, if not, whether
the hypothesized deviation plus other conditions could
lead to a hazard.
Our Backward Analysis tool allows the system de-
signer to start from a hazardous state and work back-
ward to determine if and how that state could be
reached. Critical points in the design are identified
that can be modified to avoid the hazardous state. For
example, a backward analysis of the handoff procedure
model found that the Pilot model can reach the haz-
ardous state Pilot Tuned To Unknown Frequency.
7.3 Visualization Tools
Our IBToolKit (Interface Builder Tool Kit) allows the
system designer to create visualizations that can be
linked to a SpecTRM-RL model [Pin97]. In addition
to simply showing the results of the model executing
in a visual format, visualizations can be created that
highlight specific system qualities. These types of visu-
alizations can aid in the design of automated systems
to maximize the strengths of both the human and au-
tomated controllers.
One example of a visualization that we created for
the handoff procedure is shown in Figure 4. In this vi-
sualization, the cognitive demands on the pilot during
task execution are highlighted as the model executes.
The states Pilot has not changed frequency and Fre-
quency not read back are highlighted in red to denote
the current state of the model. From this visualization,
the system designer can see that the pilot had to detect
a change in her environment in order to transition out
of the Under firm control of current controller state.
Another possible visualization would be a display of
the cockpit. As the portions of the tasks are com-
pleted by the pilot interacting with the cockpit con-
trols, the corresponding areas of the cockpit could be
highlighted. This visualization assists the system de-
signer in determining whether the actions involved in
the task support the cognitive processes required of the
pilot.
8 Related Work
Task analysis models such as Hierarchical Task Anal-
ysis (HTA) lAD67] focus on steps required by the hu-
man to complete the given task. In HTA, tasks can
be broken down into subtasks and there is no restric-
tion on the level of decomposition. The view is very
human-centered since this model was initially proposed
to represent tasks for the purpose of training new users
of applications. The focus is on the steps that must be
completed by the human to accomplish a task with-
out consideration for the operations of the computer.
HTA is very flexible, but this flexibility often leads to
ambiguity and inconsistency among models.
Many task models have been based on the Goals,
Operators, Methods and Selection Rules (GOMS)
framework [CMN83]. In the GOMS methodology, the
user's goals are decomposed into subgoals that have op-
erators (behaviors) and methods (sequences of behav-
iors) associated with them. The goals are decomposed
into four different levels of description. This model fo-
cuses on error-free performance and models the tasks
down to a very detailed description of the keystroke
level of behavior.
Task Analysis for Knowledge Descriptions (TAKD)
takes a different approach to task modeling by focusing
on the knowledge required by people to complete the
tasks [DJ89]. The TAKD method allows the knowledge
needed to complete a task to be represented by a multi-
level abstraction that traces the high-level knowledge
down to the low-level steps necessary to complete the
task. Johnson et al. developed another task analysis
approach, Task Knowledge Structures (TKS), based
on TAKD [JJ91]. The TKS methodology represents
tasks for the purpose of defining what tasks need to be
supported by the system design. Unlike many other
task models, TKS is a tool for designing systems, not
just evaluating existing designs.
Executable task models have been developed and
used for modeling human-computer interaction. Yost
used the Soar/TAQL to model the Sisyphus-93
elevator-configuration task [Yos96]. To achieve an ex-
ecutable model, Yost began with a knowledge-level
model of the task, refined this model to a problem-
space model, then created the symbol-level model that
is executable. The symbol-level model of the task
was executed to help understand what problem-solving
steps are involved during the completion of the task.
The Programmable User Model (PUM), another exe-
cutable model, provides a constrained cognitive archi-
tecture that can be programmed to simulate the user's
execution of some set of tasks using a proposed inter-
face [YGS89]. PUMs are meant to aid the interface
designer in creating more usable designs by highlight-
ing psychological considerations.
Joint human-computer controlled systems change
the human controller's function from an active con-
troller to a supervisor and error handler. However, au-
tomation design has not changed to support the human
controller's new role as a monitor of system behavior
and backup controller in case of emergency [SW95].
The Operator Function Model (OFM) provides a tool
to help improve automation design so that the human
controller tasks are supported [Mit96]. The OFM de-
scribes the required operator behavior by representing
the operator functions, subfunctions and information
needed by the operator for each activity.
9 Contributions and Future Work
We are in the process of testing this technique by mod-
eling the controller tasks in the new air traffic control
system being developed by the TAP Project at NASA
Ames. We believe that the development of these tools
will provide system designers and analysts with a more
rigorous method of analyzing the assigned controller
tasks for safety. The SpecTRM tool set provides au-
tomated analysis capabilities to the systems designer
while the visual modeling language and flexibility of
the IBToolKit allows the system designer to make de-
sign decisions with much better knowledge of the effect
of these decisions on overall system safety.
There is future work to be done in the areas of special
analyses on these types of models. We would like to see
if we can use the models to assist in task allocation.
Another problem we would like to explore using the
models is mode confusion.
We would also like to continue exploring the flexi-
bility in model analysis that is provided by the visual-
ization tools. We are currently working on an interac-
tive visualization of the ground procedures of the TAP
FAST-system with datalink capabilities. This visual-
ization to experiment with the use of an interactive
model in system design.
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Abstract
Increased automation in complex systems has led
to changes in the human controller's role and to new
types of technology-induced human error. Attempts
to mitigate these errors have primarily involved giv-
ing more authority to the automation, enhancing op-
erator training, or changing the interface. While
these responses may be reasonable under many circum-
stances, an alternative is to redesign the automation
in ways that do not reduce necessary or desirable func-
tionality or to change functionality where the trade-
offs are judged to be acceptable. This paper describes
an approach to detecting error-prone automation fea-
tures early in the development process while significant
changes can still be made to the conceptual design of
the system. The information about such error-prone
features can also be useful in the design of the operator
interface, operational procedures, or operator training.
Introduction
Today's large, complex systems often incorporate
both human and automated control and monitoring.
These jointly controlled systems are starting to expe-
rience accidents related to a lack of coordinated activ-
ity between the various controllers. One particularly
problematic feature of these new designs is a prolifera-
tion of modes, where modes define mutually exclusive
*The research described has been partly funded by NSF
Grants CCR-9396181 and CCR-9520813 and NASA Grant
NAG-l-1495.
sets of system behavior.
The new mode-rich systems provide flexibility and
enhanced capabilities, but they also increase the need
for and difficulty of maintaining mode awareness,
which can lead to new types of mode-related prob-
lems. This paper describes an approach to dealing
with mode-confusion problems by analyzing the ex-
ternal blackbox behavior of the automation for poten-
tially error-inducing features. The results can be used
to make tradeoff decisions during the early develop-
ment stages of the system.
While automation has eliminated some types of
mode-awareness errors, it has also created the poten-
tial for new types of errors. Sarter and Woods extend
the classic definition of mode error and distinguish be-
tween errors of commission (where an operator takes
an inappropriate action) and errors of omission (where
the operator fails to take a required action) [SW95].
The first automated systems tended to have only
a small number of independent modes, and functions
were associated with one overall mode setting. In ad-
dition, the consequences of operator mode awareness
problems tended to be minor, partly because feedback
about operator errors was fast and complete enough
that operators were able to recover before the errors
caused serious problems (Rasmussen's concept of error
tolerance) [Ras90].
Studies of less complex aircraft automation show
that pilots sometimes lose track of the automation be-
havior and experience difficulties with directing the
automation, primarily in the context of highly dy-
namic and/or non-normal situations [SW95]. Sarter
and Woods conclude that in most cases, these prob-
lems are associated with errors of commission, that
is,witherrorsthat requirea pilotactionin orderfor
theproblemto occur.Thistypeoferroris theclassic
modeerroridentifiedanddefinedbyNorman--anin-
tentionisexecutedinawaythatisappropriateforone
modebut thedeviceis actuallyin a differentmode.
Becausetheoperatorhastakenanexplicitaction,he
or sheis likely to checkthat the intendedeffectof
theactionhasactuallyoccurred.Theshortfeedback
loopsallowtheoperatorto repairmosterrorsbefore
seriousconsequencesr ult.Thistypeoferrorisstill
theprevalentoneonrelativelysimpledevicesuchas
wordprocessors.
Incontrast, studies of more advanced automation in
aircraft like the A-320 find that mode errors of omis-
sion are the dominant form of error [SW95]. In this
type of mode error, the operator fails to take an ac-
tion that is required, perhaps because the automation
has done something undesirable (perhaps involving a
mode change) and the operator does not notice. In
other words, the operator fails to detect and react
to an undesired system behavior that he or she did
not explicitly invoke. Because the mode or behavioral
changes are not expected, the operator is less likely
to pay attention to the relevant indications (such as
mode annunciations) at the right time and detect the
mode change or undesired behavior.
Errors of omission are closely related to the role
change of the operator from direct control to monitor,
exception handler, and supervisor of the automation.
As these roles change, the operator tasks and cognitive
demands are not necessarily reduced, but instead tend
to change in their basic nature. The added or changed
cognitive demands tend to congregate at high-tempo,
high-criticaiity periods [SW95]. While some types of
errors and failures have declined, new error forms and
paths to system breakdown have been introduced.
Some of these new error forms are a result of mode
proliferation without appropriate support. Providing
support has been complicated by some unexpected
changes in operator behavior in working with com-
plex automation. For example, during long periods of
flight, pilots do not have to monitor the mode annun-
ciations continuously. Instead, they need to predict
the occurrence of mode transitions in order to attend
to the right indications at the right time. A-320 pilots
have identified this new type of monitoring behavior
in surveys conducted by Sarter and Woods. However,
the automation and interfaces have been designed as-
suming conventional monitoring.
Simply calling for systems with fewer or less com-
plex modes is unrealistic: Simplifying modes and au-
tomation behavior often requires tradeoffs with in-
creased precision or efficiency and with marketing de-
mands from a diverse set of customers [SW95]. How-
ever, systems may exhibit accidental complexity where
the automation can be redesigned to reduce the po-
tential for human error without sacrificing system ca-
pabilities. Where tradeoffs with desired goals are re-
quired to eliminate potential mode confusion errors,
hazard analysis may be able to assist in providing the
information necessary for appropriate decision mak-
ing.
To identify and evaluate potential tradeoffs, we
need to understand why the problems occur. Acci-
dents in high-teeh systems are related to complex-
ity and coupling [Per84, Lev95]. Perrow distinguishes
between accidents caused by component failures and
those, which he calls system accidents, that are caused
by interactive complexity in the presence of tight cou-
pling. High-technology systems are often made up
of networks of closely related subsystems (some of
which may involve humans). Conditions leading to
accidents emerge in the interfaces between subsystems
and in their interactions, and coupling causes distur-
bances to progress from one component to another.
Computers have exacerbated the problems by allowing
new levels of complexity and coupling with more inte-
grated, multi-loop control in systems containing large
numbers of dynamically interacting components. In-
creased complexity and coupling make it difficult for
the designer to consider all the system hazards, or
even the most important ones, or for the operators to
handle all normal and abnormal situations and distur-
bances safely.
Some of the increased complexity has been the re-
sult of what Sarter, Woods, and Billings have called
technology-centered automation [SW95]. Too often,
the designers of the automation focus on technical as-
pects and do not devote enough attention to the cog-
nitive and other demands on the operator. Software
engineers building embedded controllers are rarely
taught or understand the set of cognitive processing
activities associated with maintaining situation and
mode awareness and how their designs can affect these
human activities. Instead, they tend to focus on the
mapping from software inputs to outputs, on mathe-
matical models of required functionality, and on the
technical details and problems internal to the com-
puter. Little attention has been given to evaluating
software in terms of whether it provides transparent
and consistent behavior that supports operators in
their monitoring and control tasks. In fact, the pri-
mary focus in software engineering and in artificial
intelligence has been on producing automation that
canfunctionautonomouslyandnotonsupportingco-
operationandcommunicationbetweenhumansand
computers.
Theresultof technology-centeredautomationhas
beenwhatWienercalls"clumsyautomation."If it is
truethatmode-relatedproblemsarecausedbyclumsy
orpoorlydesignedautomation,thenchangingthehu-
maninterface,training,or operationalproceduresi
not theobvious,orat leastheonlysolution:"Train-
ingcannotandshouldnotbethefix for baddesign"
[SW95].Instead,if wecanidentifyautomationdesign
characteristicsthat leadto modeawarenesserrorsor
thatincreasecognitivedemands,thenwemaybeable
to redesigntheautomationwithoutreducingsystem
capabilities.In addition,knowingthecausesof in-
creasedcognitiveloadwill makechangesin training
or interfacedesignmoreeffective.Theapproachcho-
senwill dependuponsuchfactorsasrelativecosts,
perceivedeffectiveness,andrequiredtradeoffs.
Toaccomplisht isgoal,designersneedto beable
to identifyproblematicdesignfeatures.Ourresearch
goalis to identifydesignconstraintson theautoma-
tionbasedonknowncognitiveconstraintsonthehu-
manoperatorandengineeredor naturalenvironmen-
tal constraints.Thefirst stepin accomplishingthis
goalistoidentifythetypesoferrorsthathumansmake
in highlyautomatedsystems.Usingthisinformation,
wecananalyzetheblackboxbehaviorspecifiedin the
automationrequirementso predictwhereerrorswill
occurandusethis informationto designtheautoma-
tionandtheoperatorprocedures,tasks,andinterface.
At first,wearesimplygoingto analyzecurrentde-
signs,but our longtermgoalis to identifysoftware
designcriteriaandtechniquesthatwill helpto create
betterdesignsfromthebeginning.
Forourproposedanalysisapproachto work,hu-
manerrorsmustbenon-random.Afterstudyingacci-
dentsandincidentsin thenew,highlyautomatedair-
craft,SarterandWoodshaveconcludedthat certain
errorsarepredictable[SW95]:Theyaretheregular
andpredictableconsequencesof a varietyof identi-
fiablefactors.Althoughtheyare "accentuated"by
poorinterfacedesignandgapsor misconceptionsi
the user'smentalmodelof the system,mismatches
betweenexpectedandactualautomationbehavioris
notnecessarilyrelatedtoaninadequateoperatormen-
tal modelbut canalsoresultfrominconsistentau-
tomationbehavior.SarterandWoodsidentifysome
oftheseerrorforms.Deganihasalsoidentifiedsome
featuresthatleadtomodeconfusion[Deg96],andJaffe
[JL89,Lev95]hasidentifiedgeneralrequirementscom-
pletenesscriteriato eliminatesometypesof human-
computerinteractionerrors.
Wewanto buildontheworkofSarterandWoods,
Degani,andJaffeto find thefactorsor "predictable
errorforms"that relateto automationdesignandde-
visewaysto identifythesefactorsin softwarerequire-
mentsspecifications.Ourapproachis to modelsoft-
wareblackboxbehaviorandprovideanalysismeth-
odsandtoolsto searchthemodelsforpredictabler-
ror forms.In additionto providingdesignguidance,
thisapproachmightprovidea wayof "measuring"or
evaluatingthe cognitivedemandsinvolvedin work-
ing with specificautomated evices.Hansmanhas
suggestedthat automationcomplexitybedefinedin
termsof thepredictabilityof theautomationbehav-
ior [Hans97].Thispredictabilitycanpotentiallybe
evaluatedusingourapproach.
Analyzingdesignsrequiresanappropriatemodel-
ing andspecificationlanguage.This languagemust
bebothformallyanalyzableandreadablewithoutad-
vancedmathematicaltraining.Whileautomatedtools
maybe necessaryto analyzesomeaspectsof large
andcomplexmodels,webelieve(andourempirical
evidencesupportstheview)that themostimportant
errorswill be foundby humanexperts[MLRPS97].
Therefore,oneofourgoalsin thedesignofourmodel-
inglanguageandtoolsis toprovidesupportin human
navigationandunderstandingofcomplexmodelsand
specifications.In addition,anypotentialdesignflaws
detectedbyautomatedtoolswill needto beevaluated
by humans.Thus,readabilityof themodelsisalsoa
requirementfor humanprocessingof theanalysisre-
sults. Finally,theeconomicsof systemdevelopment
areunlikelyto allowfor specialformalmodelsto be
built. Instead,ouranalysistoolsworkdirectlyonsys-
temandsoftwarerequirementsspecifications.
In thefollowingsections,wedefinetheconceptof
a "mode"morecarefully,describeourmodelinglan-
guage,describecriteriafor detectingsometypesof
modeambiguity,anddemonstratehowthesecriteria
mightbeusedin analyzingtheblackboxbehaviorof
theautomation.Thelanguageandanalysisareillus-
tratedusingamodelofaNASArobotbuilt to service
tilesontheSpaceShuttle.
Definition of a Mode
A mode defines a mutually exclusive set of system
behaviors. One convenient way to describe behavior
is to use state machine models. A machine or sys-
tem can be thought of as having a set of states. The
behavior of the system can be described by the possi-
ble transitions from one state to another. Those state
transitions are triggered by events, conditions, or sim-
ply the passage of time (which can be thought of as an
event).Asanexample,thefollowingtableshowsthe
possibletransitionsbetweenstatesgiventwosystem
modes:startupmodeandnormaloperationmode:
Startup
Normal
a b c d e
c b d e a
c d a e a
Table 1: A simple state machine with two modes
The startup and normal processing modes in this
machine determine how the machine will behave. For
example, if the conditions occur that trigger a transi-
tion from state c, the machine will transfer to state d
if it is in startup mode or to state a if it is in normal
processing mode.
A basic tenet of linear control theory is that ev-
ery controller contains a model of the general behav-
ior and current state of the controlled system. This
model may be embedded in the control logic of an
automated controller or in the mental model of a hu-
man controller. The model is updated and kept con-
sistent with the actual system state through various
forms of feedback from the system to the controller.
When the controller's model of the system diverges
from the actual system state, erroneous control com-
mands (based on the incorrect model) can lead to an
accident [Lev95]. The situation becomes more compli-
cated when there are multiple controllers because the
models of the various controllers must also be kept
consistent. A pilot, for example, must not only have
a valid model of aircraft behavior but must also have
a model of the automated systems' behavior in order
to monitor or control the automation as well as the
aircraft.
Mode confusion errors result from divergent con-
troller models. See figure 1. Note that there are sev-
eral sources of inconsistency due to improper feedback.
In attempting to categorize factors that predict
mode errors, it is useful to distinguish between dif-
ferent types of modes. Degani classifies modes into
three types [Deg96]:
1. Interface modes specify the behavior of the inter-
face. They are used to increase the size of the
input or output space.
2. Functional modes specify the behavior of the var-
ious functions of the machine.
3. Supervisory modes specify the level of interaction
or supervision (manual, semi-automatic, or auto-
matic).
We also define three types of modes, but classify them
differently. The modes are defined with respect to the
control component being specified:
1. Supervisory modes determine who or what is con-
trolling the component at any time. Control loops
may be organized hierarchically, with multiple
controllers or components, each being controlled
by the layer above and controlling the layer be-
low (see Figure 1). In addition, each component
may have multiple controllers (supervisors). For
example, a flight guidance system may be issued
direct commands by the pilot(s) or by another
computer that is itself being supervised by the
pilot(s). The robot motor controller (MAPS) de-
scribed in the next section can be in either manual
supervisory mode and controlled by a human op-
erator, or it can accept control instructions from
another computer called the "planner." Mode-
awareness errors related to confusion in coordina-
tion between the multiple supervisors of a control
component can be defined in terms of these su-
pervisory modes.
2. Component operating modes control the behav-
ior of the control component itself. They may
be used to control the interpretation of the in-
terface (Degani's interface modes) or to describe
its required process-control behavior. For exam-
ple, MAPS operation may be enabled or disabled
at any time, depending on whether it is safe for
MAPS to move the robot.
. Controlled-system operating modes specify sets of
related behaviors of the controlled system and are
used to indicate its operational state. For ex-
ample, the MAPS model of the robot indicates
whether it is in a moving mode (between work
areas), in a work mode (in a work area and ser-
vicing tiles, during which time the robot is not
controlled by MAPS but by the planner) or is in
an unknown mode (which means that MAPS does
not know whether the robot is in moving mode or
work mode).
The Modeling Language
Most software errors leading to accidents can be
traced to incorrect or incomplete specifications rather
than to incorrect implementations. While develop-
ing hazard analysis techniques, we have been trying
to understand how to design specification languages
that will facilitate analysis (by both humans and au-
tomated tools) of system and software requirements
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Figure 1: An example of a simple multiple-controller process-control system. To simplify the diagram, we have
shown only one digital (computer) controller. In complex systems there may be several human, digital, or analog
controllers at each level of hierarchical control and also more hierarchical levels than shown here. Note that each
controller has several mental or logical models of the machine or process it is controlling as well as its interfaces.
These models must be kept consistent for correct and safe monitoring and control.
specifications.Wehavefoundthateffectiverrorde-
tectionrequirespecificationsthatarereadableandre-
viewablebyhumandesignersandapplicationexperts
aswellasanalyzablebyautomatedtools.
Ourfirstlanguage,RSML(RequirementsStateMa-
chineLanguage),wasdesignedwhilespecifyingthe
systemrequirementsforTCASII, anairborneaircraft
collisionavoidancesystem,for the FAA [LHHR94].
Usingthe lessonslearnedfrom thisexperienceand
others,wearedesigninga toolkit calledSpecTRM
(SpecificationToolsandRequirementsMethodology)
that includesa requirementsspecificationlanguage
SpecTRM-RL.UnderneathSpecTRM-RLthereis a
formalstatemachinemodelcalledRSM[JLHM91]
uponwhichwehavedefineda setof correctnessand
completenessdesigncriteriaforsafety-criticalprocess-
controlsystemspecifications.
OneofourgoalsforSpecTRM-RListo incorporate
featuresto assistindesigninglesserror-pronehuman-
computerinteractionsandinterfacesandin detect-
ingpotentialcommunicationproblems,suchasmode
confusion.Althoughthenotationhaschangedfrom
RSML,thesystembehavioris still representedusing
hierarchicalndorthogonalstatemachines.Because
themajorityof theerrorsanddifficultyin reviewing
ourTCASII modelstemmedfromtheuseofinternal,
broadcastevents,wehaveeliminatedthisfeature.We
havealsoincludedfeaturesto assistin findingcommon
dangerousomissionsanderrorsin process-controle-
quirementspecifications.Thelanguagedesignisnot
quitecomplete,butFigure2showspartof anexam-
plespecificationforaNASArobotbuilttoservicetiles
on theSpaceShuttle.Thesoftwarerequirementsare
takenfromamaster'slevelprojectat theCMUSoft-
wareEngineeringInstitutefor part of a robot that
wasbeingdesignedandconstructedin theRobotics
Department[MMR92].Thesystemcomponentused
astheexamplein thispaperiscalledMAPS(Mobility
andPositioningSoftware).
Becauseourspecificationsareblackbox,theymust
describetherequiredbehaviorof thecomponent(in
thiscaseMAPS)in termsonlyofinputs,outputs,the
relationshipbetweenthese,anda modelof thecon-
trolledsystem.Thespecificationsdonotincludeany
informationabouttheimplementationor internalde-
signof thecomponent,simplythe input to output
functionit computespecifiedin termsof operating
modes,an internalmodelof thecontrolledsystem,
andaninternalmodeloftheinterfaceswithits super-
visor(s)andthecontrolledprocess(es).
Aswithmanycomplexcontrolsystems,thisrobot
hasmultiplecontrollersandmultiplelevelsofcontrol.
MAPSis a a mid-levelcontroller responsible for is-
suing movement commands to the motor controller,
which controls the mobile base of the robot (see Fig-
ure 3).
MAPS in turn can be controlled either by a hu-
man operator or by an onboard computer called the
planner. The operator controls robot movement and
positioning using a hand-held joystick. The planner
can also control robot movement but does so by pro-
viding MAPS with a specification of the desired des-
tination and route. Thus there are two supervisory
modes: joystick and planner (see Figure 2). Either the
human controller or the planner may assume control
at any time, but the human controller is responsible
for supervising the behavior of the robot at all times
to prevent accidents, even when it is under planner
control. Because of the distributed control structure,
multiple possibilities for mode confusion exist.
The supervisory interface consists of the controls
by which a supervisor directs the control component
(in this case MAPS) and the displays by which the
component relays information back to the supervisor.
(Note that displays are not limited to visual displays;
they can also include aural and other types of com-
munication.) The operator can control MAPS using a
joystick with two buttons and a keyboard, as shown in
Figure 2. MAPS provides information to the operator
via a graphical user interface. The MAPS behavioral
requirements use only information about the content
of the interface, not the specific layouts or design of the
controls and displays (which is specified elsewhere).
The communication interface with the planner is spec-
ified similarly.
In addition to the supervisory interface, there is
an interface with the controlled system (other robot
components), which includes the inputs and outputs
between MAPS and the various sensors and actua-
tors. These interface models are simply the view that
MAPS has of the interfaces--the real interface(s) may
contain different information due to various types of
incorrect design or failures. By separating the as-
sumed interface and the real interface, we are able
to model and analyze the effects of various types of
errors and failures.
The MAPS operational modes are:
• ENABLED or DISABLED: MAPS operation is en-
abled only if the safety circuit has signalled that
the robot is in a safe state, the operator has de-
pressed the deadman switch, and the robot's ma-
nipulator arm is stowed.
• OFF or OPERATIONAL: MAPS may be turned off
or it may be operational.
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The MAPS operational modes are relatively simple;
a typical flight management component has a large
number of such modes, leading to more potential for
mode confusion.
The controlled system (in this case the robot) is
described (within the MAPS model) in terms of its
operating modes and a model of its relevant states.
The robot controlled by MAPS is either MOVING or
STOPPED (performing inspection and maintenance) or
its operating mode is UNKNOWN. MAPS only controls
motion; the servicing of the tiles is controlled by the
planner. The robot is also either IN-A-WORK-AREA,
BETWEEN-WORK-AREAS, or its location is UNKNOWN.
The commands that MAPS issues will depend on these
operating modes.
The last section of the MAPS high-level specifica-
tion is the internal model of the state of the robot.
Note that the interface and robot models are simply
the internal models that MAPS has of the assumed
state of the interface controls and displays and the as-
sumed state of the robot, not their actual, physical
state. The internal model may not be consistent with
the real interface and robot states due to various types
of errors and failures. For MAPS, the physical com-
ponents of the robot that need to be modeled in order
to specify the control algorithm are the stabilizer legs,
the safety circuit, the manipulator arm, and the motor
controller. Hierarchical control is common in complex
systems: In this case, MAPS provides commands to
the motor controller, which itself has operating modes
and a state model.
The language enforces certain constraints to pre-
vent design features that are known to lead to acci-
dents. For example, in SpecTRM-RL, all components
of the controlled system model (e.g., the robot model)
must have an UNKNOWN state, which is the default for
startup and for transitions from any type of temporary
or partial shutdown to normal processing. The con-
trolled system can usually continue to change state
when the computer is shut down, and the software
model of the process must be updated at startup or
restart to reflect the actual process state. Many ac-
cidents have occurred in systems where the software
assumed the status of the process had not changed
since the computer was last operational and issued
commands based on this erroneous information.
As with all state-machine models, transitions are
governed by external events and the current state of
the modeled system. In SpecTRM-RL, the conditions
under which transitions are taken are specified sep-
arately from the graphical depiction of the state ma-
chine. We have found that the behavior of real systems
is too complex to write on a line between two boxes.
Instead we use a form of logic table we call AND/OR
tables. Figure 4 shows an example specification of a
transition.
Once a blackbox model of the required system be-
havior has been built, this model can be evaluated as
to whether it satisfies design criteria that are known
to minimize errors and accidents.
Design Criteria and Analysis
Jaffe [JLHM91] originally identified 26 complete-
ness criteria for requirements specifications, which we
have now extended to close to 50 criteria [Lev95].
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Figure 4: An example of a transition definition in SpecTRM-RL. The supervisory mode transitions from PLANNER
to JOYSTICK if the enabled state is entered or if the following three conditions are true: the operator selects
JOYSTICK mode, the safety-circuit is in state SAFE, and the joystick is in the NEUTRAL position.
These criteria include a mixture of absolute criteria
as well as heuristics for finding flaws that frequently
lead to accidents. Many of these are related to human-
computer interaction such as providing appropriate
feedback during graceful degradation and completely
specifying preemption logic when multi-step operator
inputs can be interrupted before they are complete.
A few of the Jaffe criteria were derived from mathe-
matical completeness aspects of the underlying formal
RSM model, but most resulted from the experience
Jaffe had in building such systems over a large num-
ber of years. These lessons learned were used to define
design criteria for the formal RSM model. In attempt-
ing to extend the criteria (design constraints) to cover
mode-confusion errors, we have taken the same ap-
proach.
Using the results of Sarter and Woods' studies of
A-320 accidents and incidents along with other reports
of mode-related error and building on the five types
of mode-confusion design features identified by De-
gani, we have identified approximately fifteen design
features of blackbox automation behavior not in our
original Jaffe criteria that can lead to operator mode
confusion or mode awareness errors. The work is in
the preliminary stages, and the list will undoubtedly
change as we investigate further. In this section, we
illustrate the approach by describing a few items on
the preliminary list and demonstrate their application
to MAPS (where applicable).
Applying our criteria to a complex control system
will almost surely identify a large number of behav-
iors that could lead to mode confusion. Getting rid
of all such behaviors would most likely result in an
overly simple control system that does not satisfy
many of its goals. Instead, this information should
be used to eliminate accidental complexity (i.e., the
same functionality can be achieved but in a less error-
inducing manner), to provide information for safety
tradeoff analyses (perhaps by applying hazard analy-
sis to the identified behaviors), and to design inter-
faces, operational procedures, and operator training
programs. For example, accidents most often occur
during transitions between normal and non-normal
operating modes or while operating in non-normal
modes. Therefore, the non-normal mode transitions
should be identified and have more stringent design
constraints applied to them.
The rest of the paper describes six of our categories
of potential design flaws: interface interpretation er-
rors, inconsistent behavior, indirect mode changes, op-
erator authority limits, unintended side effects, and
lack of appropriate feedback. Additional criteria can
be found in [Lev95] and others will be described in
future papers.
Interface Interpretation Errors
Interface mode errors are the classic form of mode con-
fusion error: the computer interprets user-entered val-
ues differently than intended or it maps multiple con-
ditions onto the same output depending on the active
controller operational mode and the operator inter-
prets the interface erroneously. The latter is Degani's
two plant state, one display flaw.
A common example of an input interface interpre-
tation error occurs with many word processors where
the user may think they are in insert mode but instead
are in command mode and their input is interpreted
differentlythantheyintended.
Anexampleof anoutputinterfacemodeproblem
wasidentifiedby Cooket.al, in a medicaloperat-
ing roomdevicewith twooperatingmodes:warmup
andnormal[CPWM91].Thedevicestartsinwarmup
modewhenturnedonandchangesfromnormalmode
to warmupmodewhenevereitherof twoparticular
settingsareadjustedbytheoperator.Themeaningof
alarmmessagesandtheeffectofcontrolsaredifferent
in thesetwomodes,butneitherthecurrentdeviceop-
eratingmodenorachangeinmodeareindicatedto the
operator.In addition,fourdistinctalarm-triggering
conditionsaremappedontotwo alarmmessagesso
thatthesamemessagehasdifferentmeaningsdepend-
ing on theoperatingmode.In orderto understand
whatinternalconditiontriggeredthemessage,theop-
eratormustinferwhichmalfunctionisbeingindicated
bythealarm.
A morecomplexexampleoccursin aproposedA-
320accidentscenariowherethecrew directed the au-
tomated system to fly in the TRACK/FLIGHT PATH AN-
GLE mode, which is a combined mode related to both
lateral (TRACK) and vertical (FLIGHT PATH ANGLE)
navigation:
When they were given radar vectors by the
air traffic controller, they may have switched
from the TRACK to the HDG SEL mode to
be able to enter the heading requested by
the controller. However, pushing the button
to change the lateral mode also automati-
cally changes the vertical mode from FLIGHT
PATH ANGLE to VERTICAL SPEED--the mode
switch button affects both lateral and verti-
cal navigation. When the pilots subsequently
entered "33" to select the desired flight path
angle of 3.3 degrees, the automation inter-
preted their input as a desired vertical speed
of 3300 ft. This was not intended by the pi-
lots who were not aware of the active "inter-
face mode" and failed to detect the problem.
As a consequence of the too steep descent,
the airplane crashed into a mountain [SW95].
Several design constraints can assist in reducing in-
terface interpretation errors. The first is that any
mode used to control interpretation of the supervi-
sory interface should be annunciated to the operator
(that is, it should be part of the displays interface in
our modeling language). More generally, the current
operating mode of the automation should be annun-
ciated (should be in the displays interface) as well as
being part of the operating modes. In addition, any
change of operating mode should trigger a change in
the current operating mode reflected in the interface
(and thus displayed to the operator), i.e., the annunci-
ated mode must be consistent with the internal mode.
Consistency between displayed and current mode is, of
course, an obvious design constraint and a violation al-
most always signals an error in the requirements spec-
ification. The first constraint should hold for almost
all systems as well.
Degani notes a third type of interface confusion er-
ror that results from mapping a single input control ac-
tion to multiple internal mode changes, depending on
the order of the control actions. He calls this circular
mode transitions. For example, pushing a button on a
device with a small input interface (e.g., a watch with
one or two buttons) will often cycle through the possi-
ble modes, going to the next mode with the next but-
toil push. A possible design constraint here is that if a
control input is used to trigger a mode transition, then
it must be associated with only one mode change, that
is, the mapping from control inputs to mode changes
is one-to-one (a mathematical function). Note that
it is unlikely that one would want to require that the
function be bijective, because that would eliminate the
possibility of all indirect mode changes. For some sim-
ple devices, even the constraint that the function be
injective (one-to-one) may be impossible to enforce,
and feedback about the current mode is the only pos-
sible solution to the problem.
Another design constraint related to these types of
interface interpretation errors is that interpretation of
the supervisory interface should not be conditioned on
modes (an example is the accident related to the inter-
pretation of "33" described earlier). This constraint
is much stronger than the first three and may not al-
ways be feasible or desirable to enforce. However, our
analysis tools will highlight these transitions to the
designer/analyst so that appropriate scrutiny can be
applied to that part of the design. Degani's circular
mode transition is a subcase of this design constraint.
In the MAPS design, while MAPS movement is be-
ing supervised by the automated planner, the opera-
tor is removed from process control and acts simply
as a safety monitor. There are six conditions under
which MAPS will stop the movement of the robot:
(1) the robot reaches the work area, (2) MAPS is dis-
abled, (3) MAPS enters planner mode, (4) MAPS en-
ters joystick mode, (5) the safety circuit detects an
unsafe condition, or (5) the deadman is released (Fig-
ure 5. Three of these actions involves the operator
directly the selection of the joystick mode, selection
of the planner mode, and the release of the deadman
switch--and the operator will know why the robot
wasstopped.In a fourthcase,thesafetycircuitsig-
nalsanunsafestateandanerrormessageisgenerated
andsento theoperatorinterfaceto indicatewhythe
robotstopped.But theoperatorcannotdifferentiate
betweentheothertworeasons,andMAPScanenter
theDISABLEDmodewithoutindicatingthereasonto
theoperator.A straightforwardsolutionis simplyto
provideadditionalstatusmessagesto thedisplay.
Inconsistent Behavior
A more complex type of mode-confusion error, which
is more often related to errors of omission than the
interface errors mentioned above, is triggered by in-
consistent behavior of the automation. Carroll and
Olson define a consistent design as one where a simi-
lar task or goal is associated with similar or identical
actions [CO88]. Consistent behavior makes it easier
for the operator to learn how a system works, to build
an appropriate mental model of the automation, and
to anticipate system behavior.
An example of inconsistency was detected in an
A-320 simulator study involving a go-around below
100 feet above ground level. Sarter and Woods found
that pilots failed to anticipate and realize that the
autothrust system did not arm when they selected
TOGA (take off/go around) power under these condi-
tions because it did so under all other circumstances
where TOGA power is applied [SW95]. Another ex-
ample of inconsistent automation behavior, which was
implicated in an A-320 accident, involves a protection
function that is provided in all automation configu-
rations except the altitude acquisition mode in which
the autopilot was operating.
Consistency is particularly important in high-
tempo, tlighly dynamic phases of flight where pilots
may have to rely on their automatic systems to work as
expected without constant monitoring. Even in more
low pressure situations, consistency (or predictability)
is important in light of the evidence from pilot surveys
that their normal monitoring behavior may change on
advanced flight decks [SW95].
Pilots on conventional aircraft use a highly trained
instrument scanning pattern of recurrently sampling
a given set of basic flight parameters. In contrast,
some A-320 pilots explained that they no longer have
a scan anymore but allocate their attention within and
across cockpit displays on the basis of expected behav-
ior. Their monitoring objective is to verify expected
automation states and behaviors. If the automation
behavior is not consistent, mode errors of omission
may occur where the pilot fails to intervene when nec-
essary:
Note the fundamental difference between
these two monitoring strategies. In the case
of a standard pattern, the pilot's attention
allocation is externally guided while moni-
toring on advanced aircraft requires mental
effort on the part of the pilot who has to
determine on his own where to look next un-
der varying task circumstances. Based on his
expectations, the pilot only monitors part of
all available data. Parameters that are not
expected to change may be neglected for a
long time. A standard instrument scan, on
the other hand, serves to ensure that all rel-
evant parameters concerning airplane behav-
ior will be monitored at certain time intervals
to make sure that no unexpected and maybe
undesirable changes occur [SW95].
In our previous design criteria and analysis tools,
we include a check for nondeterminism in the software
behavior, that is, we check to determine whether more
than one transition can be taken out of a state under
the same conditions [HL96]. But consistency in this
case requires more than simple deterministic behavior
on the part of the automation. If the operator provides
the same inputs but different outputs (behaviors) re-
sult for some reason other than what the operator has
done (or even may know about), then the behavior is
inconsistent from the operator viewpoint even though
it is not mathematically inconsistent. More formally,
inconsistent behavior results from two state transition
functions of the form:
tl :SXio xx---, {s x O}'
t2 : s x io x y _ {s x O}"
where s E E is a state, io is an operator input, O is an
output, and x and y can be states, reference values,
supervisory interface values, etc.
We have identified several different design con-
straints related to various types of inconsistency. How-
ever, there may be reasons why having such inconsis-
tencies is necessary or reasonable. Again, our tools
can point out such potential problems to the de-
signer/analyst who must make the final decision about
whether the automation should be changed. Because
consistency may be most important during critical sit-
uations or when the behavior is related to a safety
design constraint, our hazard analysis tools may be
able to assist with these decisions and our new intent
specifications [Lev97] (a form of Rasmussen's means-
ends hierarchy adapted for software) can be used to
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Figure 5: Example of the conditions under which robot movement is stopped
trace such behavior back to its original system goals
and safety constraints to identify any reasons for the
specified inconsistent behavior.
Indirect Mode Changes
Indirect mode changes occur when the automation
changes mode without an explicit instruction by the
operator. Such transitions may be triggered on condi-
tions in the controller (such as preprogrammed enve-
lope protection) or sensor input about the state of the
controlled system (such as achievement of a prepro-
grammed target or an armed state with a preselected
mode transition).
Like many of the other mode-confusion problems
noted in this paper, indirect mode transitions create
the potential for mode errors of omission and of inad-
vertent activation of modes by the operator. Again,
the problems are related to changes in scanning meth-
ods and difficulty in forming expectations of uncom-
manded or externally triggered behavior.
Behavioral expectations are formed based on the
operators' knowledge of input to the automation and
on his or her mental model of the automation's de-
signed behavior. Gaps or misconceptions in the op-
erator's mental model may interfere with predicting
and tracking indirect mode transitions or with under-
standing the interactions between different modes.
An example of an accident that has been attributed
to an indirect mode change occurred while an A-320
was landing in Bangalore. In this case, the pilot se-
lection of a lower altitude while the automation was
in the ALTITUDE ACQUISITION mode resulted in the
activation of the OPEN DESCENT mode. It has been
speculated that the pilots did not notice the mode an-
nunciation because the indirect mode change occurred
during approach when the pilots were busy and they
were not expecting the change [SW95]. Another exam-
ple of such an indirect mode change in the A-320 au-
tomation involves an automatic mode transition trig-
gered when the airspeed exceeds a predefined limit.
For example, if the pilot selects a very high vertical
speed that results in the airspeed decreasing below
a particular limit, the automation will change to the
OPEN CLIMB mode, which allows the airplane to regain
speed. As a final example, Palmer has described an ex-
ample of a common indirect mode transition problem
called a "kill-the-capture bust" that has been noted
in hundreds of ASRS reports [Pal96]. Leveson and
Palmer have modeled an example of this problem in
SpecTRM-RL and shown how it could be detected and
fixed [LP97].
Another example of indirect mode change can be
found in the MAPS specification. In this scenario,
MAPS is in ioystick supervisory mode and it receives
a message from the planner that the robot has reached
the work area. This message will cause MAPS to tran-
sition from ENABLED to DISABLED mode (see Figure 5)
without any explicit instruction from the human oper-
atorandwithoutinformingtheoperatorof themode
change.If theanalystdecidesthat this is a poten-
tially dangerousscenario,theproblemcanbesolved
byaugmentingthetransitionANY----* IN-WORK-AREA
as seen in Figure 6.
In general, there are four ways to trigger a mode
change:
1. Operator explicitly selects a new mode.
2. Operator enters data (such as a target altitude)
or a command that leads to a mode change:
(a) Under all conditions.
(b) When the automation is in a particular
state.
(c) When the controlled system model or envi-
ronment is in a particular state.
3. Operator does not do anything but the transition
is triggered by conditions in the controlled sys-
tem.
4. Operator selects a mode change but the automa-
tion does something else, either because of the
state of the automation and/or the state of the
controlled system.
The formal definitions are obvious and are omitted
here. Degani also notes these types of indirect mode
changes, but he gives them different names and clas-
sifies them differently than we do.
Operator errors associated with indirect mode
changes are a phenomenon found primarily in ad-
vanced automation. Early automation tended to in-
volve only a small number of independent modes.
Most functions were associated with only one over-
all mode setting. We probably do not want to go back
to automation that will change mode only in response
to direct operator input, but design constraints are
desirable that limit such indirect transitions and elim-
inate it when possible. Our analysis methods highlight
mode changes that are independent of direct and im-
mediate instructions from human supervisors, and our
tools may also be able to assist the analyst in identi-
fying the most hazardous indirect mode changes.
Operator Authority Limits
Interlocks and lockouts are often used to ensure safety.
Interlocks are commonly used to prevent hazardous
system states by enforcing correct sequencing of events
or actions or to isolate two events in time. A lockout
makes it impossible or difficult to enter a hazardous
state.
Authority limiting is a type of lockout or interlock
that prevents actions that could cause the system to
enter a hazardous state. Such authority limitations
must be carefully analyzed to make sure they do not
prohibit maneuvers that may be needed in extreme
situations. Recent events have involved pilots "fight-
ing" with the automation over control of the aircraft
after observing unexpected or undesirable aircraft or
automation behavior.
Various types of authority limits are used to pre-
vent operator error or to provide protection when the
operator cannot or does not take proper action. For
example, automation on advanced aircraft often has
the ability to detect and prevent or recover from pre-
defined unsafe aircraft configurations such as a stall.
Once a hazardous state is detected, the automation
has the power to override or limit pilot input.
Some accidents and incidents in highly automated
aircraft have involved pilots not being able to over-
come the protection limits or the pilots not being
aware that the protection functions were in force. For
example, the pilots during one A-320 approach dis-
connected the autopilot while leaving the flight direc-
tors and the autothrust system engaged. Under these
conditions, the automation provides automatic speed
protection by preventing the aircraft from exceeding
upper and lower airspeed limits:
At some point during the approach, after
flaps 20 had been selected, the aircraft ex-
ceeded the upper airspeed limit for that con-
figuration by 2 kts. As a consequence, the
automation intervened by pitching the air-
plane up to reduce airspeed back to 195
kts. The pilots, who were not aware that
the automatic speed protection was active,
observed the uncommanded automation be-
havior. Concerned about the unexpected
reduction in airspeed at this critical phase
of flight, they rapidly increased thrust to
counterbalance the automation. As a conse-
quence of this sudden burst of power, the air-
plane pitched up to about 50 degrees, entered
a sharp left bank, and went into a dive. The
pilots eventually disengaged the autothrust
system and its associated protection function
and regained control of the aircraft [SW95].
Various design criteria are related to authority lim-
its. For example, information about any modes or
states where the operator input is ignored or limited
must be provided in the supervisory interface. In ad-
dition, the analysis tools can examine the specified
software behavior and detect exceptions to following
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Figure 6: Modified transition to the IN-WORK-AREA mode.
operator requests. Again, the information in the in-
tent specification is useful in determining whether such
design features are intentional and whether they are
related to identified hazards.
Unintended Side Effects
Mode ambiguity can also arise when an action in-
tended to have one particular effect has an additional
effect, i.e. an unintended side effect. An example oc-
curred in the Sarter and Woods A-320 simulator study
where it was discovered that pilots were not aware that
entering a runway change after entering data for the
assigned approach results in the deletion of all pre-
viously entered altitude and speed constraints even
though they may still apply.
This type of design flaw differs from indirect mode
changes in that the unintended change is not in the
mode but in some other type of information, such as
reference values. Degani describes this type of prob-
lem in terms of a mode/reference value interaction,
but more generally the same problem occurs when
any operator entry (for example, an input value rather
than a mode change) has unintended side effects.
Unintended side effects can contribute to mode con-
fusion, and often need to be evaluated by the design
team. If a decision is made to keep the behavior,
proper feedback constraints may be required to pre-
vent the type of confusion that seems to result.
Lack of Appropriate Feedback
Many of the original Jaffe criteria or the newly defined
criteria mentioned above are related to providing ap-
propriate feedback (e.g., providing feedback about the
status of interlocks and lockouts and providing grace-
ful degradation). In general, operators need to have
the information necessary to understand the mode
transitions taken, i.e., the conditions that trigger tran-
sitions. Operators need not only to track the current
active modes and to understand their implications,
but they also need to keep track of other automa-
tion and system status information that may result
in the indirect activation of modes. The difference
between these design constraints and those requiring
mode transition annunciations described in the section
on interface interpretation errors is that in this case
the automated system must not simply notify the op-
erator that a mode change has already occurred (an-
nunciate the present mode), but it must provide the
information necessary for the operator to predict or
anticipate mode changes.
Incomplete feedback is often implicated in accident
scenarios. For example, in the A-320 Bangalore acci-
dent, the pilot flying (PF) had disengaged his flight
director during the approach and was assuming that
the pilot-not-flying (PNF) would do the same thing
[SW95]. The result would have been a mode configu-
ration in which airspeed is automatically controlled by
the autothrottle (the SPEED mode), which is the rec-
ommended procedure for the approach phase. How-
ever, the PNF never turned off his flight director, and
the OPEN DESCENT mode became active when a lower
altitude was selected. This indirect mode change (ex-
plained above) led to the hazardous state and eventu-
ally the accident. But a complicating factor was that
each pilot only received an indication of the status of
his own flight director and not all the information nec-
essary to determine whether the desired mode would
be engaged. The lack of feedback or knowledge of the
complete system state contributed to the pilots not
detecting the unsafe state in time to reverse it.
Where automation has the ability to take au-
tonomous actions (i.e., those not directly commanded
by the operator), information interchange becomes
crucialin coordinatingactivitiesandindetectingmis-
matchesbetweenexpectedandactualsystembehav-
ior. A behavioraldescriptionof thesoftware,aspro-
videdin SpecTRM-RL,is usefulin determiningex-
actlywhatinformationtheoperatorneedsto monitor
andcontroltheautomatedsystem.
Theproblemsof providingsalientfeedbackare,of
course,muchmorecomplicatedthansimplyidentify-
ing the informationthat needsto beconveyed,but
identificationis animportantstepin theprocess.In
our originalJaffecriteria,weidentifieddesigncon-
straintsonbasicfeedbackto thecomputeraboutthe
stateofthecontrolledprocessandsometypesofoper-
atorfeedbackrequirements,but theseneedto beaug-
mentedwith a completesetof requirementson the
feedbackto the operatoror automationsupervisor.
An exampleconstraintis that operatorsmusthave
accessto all informationoncriticalmodetransitions
inorderto predictandmonitorthosetransitions.
Oneimportantaspectof usingfeedbackfor error
detectionis theneedforindependenti formation.Er-
rorscanonlybefoundthroughdiscrepanciesin redun-
dantinformation.Onewayto detecthat automated
equipmentisnotoperatingcorrectlyisforoperatorsto
detecta discrepancybetweentheautomationbehav-
iorandtheirmentalmodelof howtheythinktheau-
tomationshouldwork.However,operatorsoftenhave
limitedunderstandingof complexautomationbehav-
iororareafraidto stepin.
In addition,oftenanerrorisonlydetectableusing
someinformationaboutthestateoftheenvironment
or thecontrolledprocess.However,if theerroneous
behavioris occurringbecausetheautomationiscon-
fusedabouttheenvironmentorsystemstate,thenit
obviouslycannotprovidethisinformationto theoper-
ator.That is,theautomationmayshowonlyconsis-
tentinformationbecauseit doesnotknowthereisan
errorin its systemmodel.Therefore,it isnotsurpris-
ingthat SarterandWoodsfoundthat pilotsmostly
founderrorsthroughinformationgivenin nonauto-
mateddisplaysandinstruments(i.e.,basedonobser-
vationsbetweendesiredandactualaircraftbehavior,
not on indicationsof the nominalstatusof theau-
tomatedsystems).Thesamephenomenonis truefor
othertypesofsystems.Theproblemiscomplicatedby
thefactthatoperatorscannotalwayseewhattheau-
tomationisdoingandcanonlytell bydirectlyobserv-
ingthereactionof thesystemor bygettingfeedback
fromsomeindependentdisplay.Providingindepen-
dentfeedbackandprovidingmorefeedbackonwhat
theautomationisdoingcanalleviatetheseproblems.
Conclusions and Future Work
Wehaveoutlinedanapproachto reducingpotential
modeconfusionerrors.Thesoftwarerequirementsare
modeledusinga hierarchicalstatemachinelanguage
andthenanalyzed(manuallyor with automatedas-
sistance)to identifyviolationsof a setof designcon-
straintsassociatedwith mode-confusionerrors.The
approachwasillustratedwithamodelofthesoftware
controllinga NASArobotanda descriptionof a few
ofourcurrentlyidentifiedsoftwaredesignconstraints.
Thisworkis still in the preliminarystages.We
needto completeandpartiallyvalidateoursetofcon-
straintsbyexaminingmoreaccidentsandincidentsto
determinewhetherthecurrentsetwouldidentifythe
factorsinvolved.Oncewearefairly confidentabout
ourlist,weplantovalidatethefeasibilityof applying
theconstraintstorealspecificationsbybuildingapro-
totypeanalysistoolandapplyingit to a modelof an
advancedaircraftFMS(probablynot theA-320,from
whichmanyoftheconstraintswereoriginallyderived).
A possiblestepafterthatwouldbeto useincidentre-
portsfromoneor moreofthereportingsystems(e.g,
ASRS,CHIRP,or EUCARE)for that aircraftto see
if ourpredictionsareaccurate.
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